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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

GENNARO LANGELLA,
Petitioner,

-against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether or not the Trial Court deprived Petitioner of due process of law in refusing to recuse itself because sufficient cause was shown to cause a reasonable man to have significant doubts as to whether the Trial Court could be impartial because it had previously investigated Petitioner when it was a State Prosecutor.

2. Whether or not the Trial Court violated Petitioner's due process right and also Title 28, United States Code, Sections 144 and 455 in not requiring another Judge to make the decision regarding the Trial Court's impartiality.

3. Whether or not impanelling an anonymous jury deprives a defendant, except in the case of great necessity, of his due process right and his right to trial by an impartial jury.

4. Other questions adopted in this Petition which are specifically set forth in the Petitions filed by the various Co-Petitioners in this case.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is a Petition by Petitioner, Gennaro Langella, from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, decided October 27, 1987, with a thirty-seven page opinion, which affirmed a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Honorable John F. Keenan), rendered on November 13, 1986, convicting

Petitioner of the crimes of RICO, RICO Conspiracy and various substantive crimes, pursuant to 18 United States Code, Sections 1961, 1962 and other substantive statutes. Petitioner received sixty-five years in jail, consecutive to a ten year sentence he had already been serving.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Title 28 United States Code, Section 1251. The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reprinted at length in the Petition of Carmine Persico, as co-petitioner, No. 87-1323, is hereby incorporated.

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C., Section 1961 Definitions

As used in this chapter --

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A)incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, of which is unforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B)which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

18 U.S.C., Section 1962 Prohibited activities

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of Section 2, Title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income or the proceeds of such income in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the inten-

tion of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlaw debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section.

18 U.S.C., Section 201 Bribery of public officials and witnesses

(a) for the purpose of this section:

"public official" means Member of Congress,

the Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after he has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency or branch of Government, or a juror; and

"person who has been selected to be a public official" means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been officially informed that he will be so nominated or appointed; and

"official act" means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit.

(b) Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent --

(1) to influence any official act; or

(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or

(3) to induce such public official or

such person who has been selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty

(f) Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official.

FACTS

Petitioner, Gennaro Langella, adopts the Facts set forth in the Petitions of Carmine Persico, Docket No. 87-1323, and the Petition of Alphonse Persico, John DeRoss and Anthony Scarpati, Docket No. 87-1324.

Petitioner, Gennaro Langella, was named in many of the counts in this indictment, and the government's theory was that he ran the day to day operations of the Colombo Family while Carmine Persico was in jail. Consequently, it was the government's theory that Mr. Langella was involved in the construction industry aspect of the case, in that monies had been extorted from contractors in the cement industry which was involved in the construction of buildings in New York. Mr. Langella was also convicted of bribery in connection with so-called favored treatment for Carmine Persico while he was in jail, extortion and extortionate extension of credit with regard to loans, prevalently pleaded throughout the entire indictment.

Approximately fifteen days before the trial in this case actually began, Mr. Langella filed a written motion requesting the Court recuse itself, essentially on the basis that the Court, while it had been a

New York State Special Prosecutor, had investigated the Colombo Family, of which the Petitioner was allegedly a member, in connection with the killing of one of its claimed members.

In that motion Petitioner's counsel argued that one of the issues that was to be litigated in the within action was whether or not Langella was a member of the Colombo Organized Crime Family, since that was the enterprise specifically pleaded in the indictment. When Judge Keenan had been a Special Prosecutor, his office and people under his direct supervision had undertaken to investigate an alleged gangland slaying of one, Joey Gallo, which had occurred on April 7, 1972, and the Judge while a prosecutor had personally debriefed on alleged organized crime figure, one, Joseph Luparelli, who told him that the "Colombo Family" was responsible for the killing of Joey Gallo as revenge for the fact that

they believed he had ordered the attempted murder of their former leader, Joseph Colombo. Luparelli, in his debriefing by Judge Keenan and his staff, allegedly specifically mentioned Gennaro Langella's name and his role in the alleged Colombo Family organization.

The Court not only refused to recuse itself but refused to allow the decision to be made by another Court, in clear violation of Section 144 of Title 28, United States Code, and it proceeded to make the decision itself based upon matters which were within the Court's own knowledge based upon the Court's own private investigation and which were clearly beyond the record.

POINT I

SUFFICIENT FACTS WERE RAISED BELOW TO REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF. CERTAINLY, THE COURT HAD NO RIGHT TO MAKE THAT DECISION WITHOUT A HEARING AND WITHOUT REFERRING THE MATTER TO ANOTHER JUDGE.

When defense counsel first advised the Judge that Petitioner would be making such a motion, the Judge angrily dismissed it out of hand, characterizing it as a "phony motion":

> "I consider that a phony motion... I consider that a phony motion ... what burns me up about this sort of thing is this ... pull something from one's sleeve or a rabbit from the hat that I am to be disqualified because of the Gallo investigation ... I can tell you you are going to be wasting your time."

Transcript of September 26, 1985 at 10.

When Petitioner thereafter filed a written motion for recusal, the Trial Judge denied it (A241, et seq.)* without a hearing but rather, the Judge found, based on personal knowledge and unspecified "old records" that the principal allegations in

*"A" References are to Pages of the Appendix in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Petitioner's affidavit were not correct. Consequently, the Judge concluded that the affidavit was insufficient. He also held that the motion was untimely, despite the fact that it was filed several weeks before any trial proceedings were scheduled to commence.

The Trial Judge's findings, as well as the procedure he employed to dispose of Petitioner's motion, were clearly incorrect. Under the applicable statutes, the motion was both timely and sufficient. Consequently, Petitioner was entitled to have Judge Keenan either recuse himself or, at a minimum, refer the motion to another Judge for a decision on the merits. The Judge's decision to instead dispose of the matter summarily based on information outside the record violated not only the controlling federal statutes but also the concept of fair and impartial justice embodied in the Due Process clause of the Federal Constitution.

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, did not comment on Petitioner's claim except for a passing reference to the anonymous jury claim.

This Court has made clear that the Constitution guarantees a tribunal which is not only free from actual bias but also free from even the appearance of bias:

> "But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice'."

In re Murchison, 340 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

More recently, the Court restated this principle thus:

> "...any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias."

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).

See also Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466,467 (Frankfurter, J.); Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D. C. Cir. 1941); Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785

F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir. 1986); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965). In the context of this fundamental constitutional right, the "appearance of impartiality is virtually as important as the fact of impartiality." Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1977). Consequently, if a Judge's presence in the trial of a case does not comport with the appearance of justice, the proceedings are improper and any resulting conviction must be reversed. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).

Sections 144 and 455 of Title 28 embody this constitutional protection and provide the procedures deemed most suitable by Congress for its implementation. Section 144 provides:

> Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall

proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.

Section 455 provides in relevant part:

"(a) any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or al lawyer with whom he previously practiced law serving during such association as a lawyer concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion con-

> cerning the merits of the particular case in controversy:
>
> (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding ..."

The "appearance of justice" standard has also been found to be implicit in section 144 by virtue of the holdings relating to the Due Process clause. Consequently, the courts have concluded that the test to be applied under both of these sections is "identical" -- whether a reasonable man apprised of the grounds on which recusal was sought might entertain a significant doubt as to the judge's impartiality in that particular case. Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. at 35-36; Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460-61 (7th Cir 1985); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980).

Although the test under both statutes is the same, the procedures they establish are markedly different and to some extent complimentary of one another. United States v. Sibla, supra. Section 455 is directed to the Judge and is self-enforcing on the part of the Judge. United States v. Sibla, supra; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). If a Judge in a case is aware of any grounds for disqualification under Section 455, he has a duty to recuse himself under that provision. United States v. Sibla, supra; Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 157 & n. 10 (6th Cir. 1979).

Even if a Trial Judge does not believe any grounds for recusal exist, however, he is required, upon the filing of a sufficient application by a party under Section 144, to transfer the matter to a

different Judge, at least for a determination of the merits of that motion. See eg. United States v. Sibla, supra. Consequently, although the presiding Judge must thus make an initial determination as to the legal sufficiency of the application, he is not authorized or permitted to make any determination as to the truth of the matters alleged therein. As this Court explained in a seminal case of Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1921), this procedure was specifically adlopted by Congress in order to eliminate any appearance of partiality from federal judicial proceedings. According to the Court, Congress intended:

> "...that the tribunals of the country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted to them but shall give assurance that they are impartial, free, to use the words of the section, from any 'bias or prejudice' that might disturb the normal course of impartial judgment. And to accomplish this end the section withdraws from the presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged. Its

> explicit declaration is that upon the making and filing of the affidavit, the judge against whom it is directed 'shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated ...to hear such matter.' And the reason is easy to devine. To commit to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives chance for the evil against which the section is directed."

In the present case, Petitioner's affidavit was more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case for disqualification. Since the allegations in that affidavit were such that the "Judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 34, 51 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 1979), the Trial Judge was required for that reason alone to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. 455.

Even if the Judge felt that the allegations in the affidavit were false or inaccurate, however, he was still obliged, under section 144, to recuse himself in

order to allow another Judge, one who was not himself the subject of the motion, to determine its merits.

Instead of doing so, the Judge in this case proceeded to make his own determination as to the truth of falsity of the allegations in Petitioner's motion. Moreover, he did so on the basis of information which was not part of the record and which was never subject to testimony under oath or to cross-examination. This summary disposition of the merits of the application, as well as the Court's finding of untimeliness, were clearly erroneous.

In his application, Petitioner Langella alleged that Judge Keenan:

a. Has a personal prejudice against me;
b. Has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
c. Has served in governmental employment and expressed an opinion about material facts going to the merits of this case; and

d. Is in a position where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(A 234-235)

Petitioner then went on to state that the basis for these beliefs was the actions taken by Judge Keenan and persons under his supervision concerning the Petitioner while Judge Keenan was the chief of the Homicide Bureau of the New York County District Attorney's office. Specifically, Petitioner alleged the following:

6. From in or around 1956 to in and around 1976, Judge Keenan was an Assistant District Attorney of New York County.
7. At various times, Judge Keenan was Chief of the Homicide Bureau and Chief Assistant District Attorney.
8. In the early 1970's, Judge Keenan was involved in the investigation of "organized crime"-related homicides.
9. One such homicide was the murder of Joey Gallo at Umberto's Clam House on April 7, 1972.
10. Judge Keenan was in charge of the investigation of the Gallo murder
11. On April 8, 1972, one Joseph Luparelli walked into FBI headquarters in Santa Ana, California and announced that he was part of the group that "hit" Joey Gallo.

12. Luparelli was flown back to New York to become an informant for the New York City Police Department and the New York County District Attorney's Office.
13. Judge Keenan directed and participated in the debriefings of Luparelli.
14. The following matters of information, among many others, were told by Luparelli to Judge Keenan and other law enforcement figures:
(a) Luparelli stated that he was the chauffeur-bodyguard to Joseph Yacovelli, who, he claimed, was consigliere and (since the shooting of Joseph Colombo on June 28, 1971) de facto "Boss" of the "Colombo crime family";
(b) Luparelli, a/k/a "Joe Fish", stated that the "Colombo family" believed Joey Gallo was responsible for the attempted murder of Joseph Colombo in late June, 1971;
(c) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that claimed leaders of the "Colombo family" met for the purpose of deciding what to do about Gallo;
(e) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that I met, in Ulster County, New York, with claimed leaders of the "Colombo family" on Tuesday, April 4, 1972;
(f) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that on April 5, 1972, I flew to Atlanta, Georgia to meet with a claimed leader of the "Colombo family";
(g) In the pre-dawn hours of Friday, April 7, 1972, Luparelli and four other claimed members of the "Colombo family" murdered Joey

Gallo, according to Luparelli's statements to Judge Keenan and others;

(h) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that after he murdered Gallo, he and the others went to hide-out in the three bedroom apartment of Joe Yacovelli at 101 Gedney Street in Nyack, New York.

(i) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that claimed "captains" of the "Colombo family" were called to the Nyack apartment in the days following the Gallo shooting and that I was one of the first to go to the apartment.

(j) Luparelli told Judge Keenan and others that he fled the Nyack apartment after several days of hiding-out because he feared for his life, and on April 18th he surrendered to the FBI.

15. Judge Keenan expressed the opinion at the time that he believed Luparelli.

16. Judge Keenan further expressed the opinion that I was a member of the "Colombo organized crime family".

17. Judge Keenan attempted to gather evidence to prove my association with the "Colombo organized crime family".

18. As a result of Judge Keenan's investigation I was subpoenaed to appear before a New York County grand jury.

19. I appeared on December 19, 1972 and was asked, among other questions, "whether [I] visited 101 Gedney Street in Nyack, New York during the month of April, 1972, and, whether inside the apartment LK...[I] also spoke with Joseph Luparelli.

20. Upon my refusal to answer those questions, Judge Keenan and the New York County District Attorney's Office obtained an indictment charging me with criminal contempt.
21. As a result of the indictment and subsequent conviction, I was sentenced to five months in prison on July 24, 1975.
22. Since the central issue of this case is whether or not I am a member of the "Colombo Organized Crime Family", and since Judge Keenan has already, as a state prosecutor, investigated that issue, concluded that I am, and expressed such an opinion to others, I believe that he should and must recuse himself, or be disqualified, with respect to my case.

It should be noted that Judge Keenan, in his decision denying Petitioner's recusal motion, confirmed that he had been "in charge of the Homicide Bureau in the New York District Attorney's Office" at the time of the Gallo murder and the ensuing investigation (A 245), that said homicide had therefore been under his jurisdiction (Id.), and that he himself had personally taken part in various aspects of the investigation (Id.). However, he denied

several of Petitioner's other factual allegations, as well as Petitioner's request that he be recused.

The allegations in Petitioner's application were more than sufficient under what has been characterized as the "broad and liberal purposes sought to be achieved" by the judicial disqualification provisions. SCA Services Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977). Petitioner's allegations clearly were based entirely on events which took place before the Judge in question took the Bench.

Moreover, the allegations were clearly of sufficient specificity to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 144. Petitioner did not rely on mere "rumors or gossip". Berger v. United States, supra. Rather, he cited specific circumstances, events and frequently even dates for the factual bases of his application.

Judge Keenan faulted the application on the ground that Petitioner had failed to cite a source for one of his allegations (A 246). In doing so, the Judge disregarded the fact that Petitioner did cite sources (i.e. personal knowledge) as well as dates and locales for most of his allegations. Moreover, as this Court noted in Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. at 34-35, the statute specifically authorizes such applications to be based on belief:

> "It is, however, said, that the assertion and the facts are stated on information and belief and that hence the affidavit is wholly insufficient, section 21 requiring facts to be stated 'and not merely belief'...The belief of a party the section makes of concern and if opinion be nearer to or farther from persuasion than belief, both are of influence and universally regarded as of influence in the affairs of men and determinative of their conduct, and it is not strange that section 21 should so regard them...We are of the opinion, therefore, that an affidavit upon information and belief

> satisfies the section and that upon its filing, if it show the objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge, which we have said is an essential condition, it is his duty to 'proceed no further' in the case."

The indictment in this case alleged that between 1968 and the filing of the indictment, Petitioner Langella had participated in a racketeering conspiracy oriented around the Colombo organized crime family. Petitioner's affidavit alleged, and Judge Keenan conceded in part, that during this period, the Judge, as a State prosecutor, or others working with him and under his supervision, investigated and prosecuted Petitioner in connection with such alleged activities. As such, the circumstances in in this case would seem to come within the specific provision of 28 U.S.C. 445(b)(2) that a judge shall disqualify himself "where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced

law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter...". The judge's disqualification would also be required under 455(b)(3) in that he had "served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy." In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1198 (4th Cir. 1976); Bradshaw v. McCotter, supra.

At the very least, Petitioner's affidavit was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for Judge Keenan's recusal on the ground that his continued participation in the case created the appearance of judicial partiality. In this regard, Judge Keenan's discussion about whether he had personally participated in the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner Langella, or whether it had been done by someone under

his supervision (A 245-246) is, in addition to being an improper analysis of the merits of Petitioner's application (see section B, infra), also irrelevant. Rather, Judge Keenan's concession that he had supervised the office which engaged in such activities (A 245) was itself sufficient to require his recusal in this case, or least a hearing.

In the present case, both Petitioner and the public had valid reason to believe that Petitioner's trial was being presided over by a judge who had previously played a part in investigating and prosecuting him. Since this circumstance created at least the appearance of partiality, Petitioner's application was clearly sufficient.

Also, the Trial Judge erred in passing judgment on the truthfulness of the factual allegations in Petitioner's application.

As previously explained, upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit, section 144 forbids the judge in question from rendering any decision as to the truth of its contents:

> "...the section withdraws from the presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged."

Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. at 36.

As the Circuit Court explained in Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen's U. Loc. No. 2 of State of N.Y., 444 F.2d 1344, 1348 (2nd Cir. 1971), this prohibition applies even if the presiding judge personally believes that the allegations in the application are incorrect:

> "Since the purpose of the section is to avoid the appearance as well as the actual existence of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, the facts stated in the affidavit as the basis for the belief that bias or prejudice exists must be accepted as true by the judge even though he or she knows the statements to be false."

Here, however, the presiding judge completely disregarded this admonition. To the contrary, he specifically rejected numerous of Petitioner's allegations as untruthful (A 245-246). Moreover, he did so based on his own recollections and his personal examination of unspecified "old records", neither of which were available for inspection or cross-examination by Petitioner:

> "At the time of the [Gallo] murder, April 7, 1972, I was in charge of the Homicide Bureau in the New York County District Attorney's Office. As such, any Manhattan homicides were under my jurisdiction. Later that month, one Joseph Luparelli surrendered to the authorities in California and stated that he had driven one of two automobiles used by the killers of Gallo. He was questioned by me and high ranking New York City police officers on April 20, 1972. On various other occasions, I participated in interviews of Luparelli. I have absolutely no recollection of his ever having mentioned Gennaro Langella in any of those interviews. As stated by the Court at the September 26, 1985 conference: 'None

> of the defendants in this case were even questioned by me nor were any of them prosecuted by me'. (Transcript at 12)
>
> The actual Grand Jury presentations relating to the matter were not conducted by me, but an Assistant to whom the case was assigned. The first that this Court realized that Mr. Langella was indicted for contempt relating to the Gallo investigation was upon receipt of the motion papers herein on September 30, 1985...After receiving the motions on September 30, 1985, the Court has caused a check to be made of old records. These confirm that I did not appear in the Grand Jury in connection with the Langella contempt matter nor did I participate in the trial of the matter in any way." (A 245-246).

Having thus contested the truth of numerous of Petitioner's allegations, the judge then went on to hold that the remaining allegations were insufficient (A 246-247).

This approach was totally improper. By making himself in effect an unsworn witness, from from cross-examination, and at the same time the supposedly neutral tribunal passing on the merits of the application , the judge was instilling the very

appearance of partiality which the procedures set forth in 144 were designed to eliminate. The court's failure to refer Petitioner's application to another judge for adjudication on the merits tainted the remainder of the proceedings before it, with the result that the ensuing conviction must be reversed.

Ir the present case, Judge Keenan's prior prosecutorial activities relating to Petitioner Langella created the very real danger that he would harbor a bias against that defendant which would affect his judgment in the many decisions to be made at the trial of this case. At the very least, it created in both the Petitioner's and the public's eye an appearance of partiality that cast a cloud over the proceedings. Given these circumstances, the trial judge was obliged to recuse himself. At the very least, he was obliged

to transfer the motion to another judge for a decision on its merits. Having failed to do either, the trial judge's continued presence tainted the trial and requires that Petitioner's conviction be set aside so that he can be retried before a tribunal which comports with constitutional and statutory requirements.

POINT II

THE DISTRICT COURT'S IMPANNELING OF AN ANONYMOUS JURY AND THE OTHER STEPS IT TOOK REGARDING THE JURY DEPRIVED THE PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.

At the request of the government and ovet objection from the defense, the District Court, prior to trial in this case, entered an order "(1) limiting voir dire examination of prospective jurors so that no vinerman's name, address, or place of employment is disclosed; (2) at trial, keeping the jurors together during recesses and having the United State Marshal's Serive take them to lunch as a group; and (3) at the end of each trial day, having the United States Marshal's Service transport the jurors as a group to an undisclosed central location, from which they can depart for their respective communities" (A 249).

Although the Second Circuit has permitted anonymous juries under certain limited

circumstances in the past, recent decisions by this Court have cast doubt on the continued validity of those holdings. Moreover, the circumstances of this case do not compel such extreme and highly prejudicial action. Since the impanelling of an anonymous jury and the other actions which the District Court ordered regarding the jury violated Petitioner's fundamental constitutional rights, his conviction must be reversed.

Secrecy in judicial proceedings has always been anathema to this country's system of criminal justice. See eg. Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-270 (1948). The impanelling of an anonymous jury is one of the most dangerous manifestations of such secrecy, in that it violates two specific constitutional guarantees - the right to trial by an impartial jury protected by the Sixth Amendment and the presumption of innocence embodied in the due process clause of

the Fifth Amendment.

A. The Sixth Amendment violation

The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury...", a right which is also guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n. 6 (1976); Irving v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1962). In United States v. Barnes, 604 F. 2d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 1979), it was held that under certain limited circumstances, this constitutional protection was not violated by restrictions imposed by a District Court on voir dire which prevented the defense from learning the prospective juror's identities, residence locale or ethnic backgrounds.

This Court has never specifically addressed the issue of the constitutionality of impanelling an anonymous jury. However,

several decisions by this Court since the Barnes decision have raised serious doubts as to the continued validity of the majority's opinion in that case. First in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), this Court acknowledged the constitutional significance of restrictions imposed on a jury voire dire:

> "Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the Trial Judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the Court's instructions and evaluate cannot be fulfilled. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895). Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule, as it is in federal courts."
>
> Id., 451 U.S. at 188.

Subsequently, the Court vacated a death sentence because the jury voir dire had been inadequate. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, explained that

the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury

> "...is not mere exhortation for it has been noted that 'the right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomitant right to take reasonable steps designed to insure that the jury is impartial.' Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Among the most important of the means designed to insure an impartial jury is the right to strike those juros who manifest an inability to try the case solely on the basis of the evidence. This right to exclude incompetent jurors cannot be exercised meaningfully or effectively unless counsel has sufficient information with which to evaluate members of the venire."

Petitioner subjits that in light of this Court's decisions, the majority's holding in Barnes, and the scope of that holding, should be re=examined. The peremptory challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused", Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). As this Court explained one century ago:

> "Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury-box from [jurors] unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremp-

> tory challenge. The [party] may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered, from his habits and associations, and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his being accepted."

Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).

Consequently, the "denial or the impairment of this right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice". Swain v. Alabama, 370 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).

This Court's recent holdings on the peremptory challenge issue crystalize its earlier decisions to the effect that "[a]ny system for the empanelling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right must be condemned ...[a defendant] cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge until ...an opportunity [has been given] for such inspection and examination of [each proposed juror] as is required for the due administration of justice." Pointer v. United States, supra, 151 U.S. at 408-409.

Since a peremptory challenge may be "exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings" Swain v. Alabama, supra, 380 U.S. at 220, the defendant must be afforded sufficient inquiry into the jurors' identities, backgrounds and attitudes to enable them to make an intelligent exercise of their peremptory challenges. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367-70 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972). Names and addresses are also essential because parties are entitled, if they so desire, to conduct an independent investigation of the jurors. See eg. United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); United States v. Costello, 255 F. 2d 876 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958). By depriving Petitioner of this basic information, the District Court pre-

vented him and his co-appellants from making a meaningful exercise of their peremptory challenges, thereby depriving them of the procedure necessary to insure their constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.

B. The Fifth Amendment violation

The impanelling of an anonymous jury also violated Petitioner's right under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the presumption of innocence. In United States v. Thomas, 75 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d. Cir. 1985),the Second Circuit acknowledged that "the presumption of innocence is of significant importance, and is protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." The Court also recognized that a judge's instructions to a juror not to reveal his name probably affects the jurors' opinion of a defendant, and thereby implicates Fifth Amendment due process (id.). Consequently, "the impanelling of an anony-

mous jury - and its impact on the presumption of innocence must therefore receive clost judicial scrutiny and be evaluated in the light of reason, principle and common sense" (Id. at 1363). According to the Court in that case, such a practice is constitutional only if there is "first, strong reason to believe that the jury needs protection and second, reasonable precaution must be taken to minimize the effect that such a decision might have on the jurors' opinion of the defendants" (Id. at 1365).

The Government failed to establish the compelling circumstances necessary to justify the practices employed here.

The District Court held that an anonymous jury was necessary in this case premarily because of the "seriousness of the offenses charged" 9A 252-53). It is therefore significant that although the government interjected numerous general allega-

tions of dangerousness into the indictment, no specific act of violence was identified anywhere in that document. Moreover, the Judge failed to conduct any hearing to determine whether the government's allegations were valid and sufficient enough to justify the aura of dangerousness and secrecy it was seeking to impose on these proceedings.

The government's second ground for seeking an anonymous jury - that defendants might seek to interfere with them if their names and addresses were known - was likewise totally unsubstantiated. It was based solely on the allegation in the indictment that some of the defendants had sought to bribe officials of the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (A 254). In relying on this justification, the District Court ignored the fact that several of the defendants had previously been in trials without anonymous juries and without any evidence whatsoever of jury tampering.

The third justification given by the government - publicity - is particularly unfair since it was the government's own press conferences, press releases and news articles which generated much of the publicity surrounding the proceedings in this case. For the government to instigage such publicity and then seek, over Petitioner's opposition, to use it to justify restrictions on the jury voir dire is clearly improper.

The District Court's decision to impanel an anonymous jury was highly prejudicial to the defendants in this case. Although the reason for that decision must have been transparently clear to the jurors so selected, any doubts in their minds were laid to rest by the media. On September 27, 1985, shortly before the commencement of trial in this case, the New York Daily News ran an article titled, "Mob Panels to Get Cover", which stated:

> "Fearing mob attempts to 'bribe, threaten or injure' jurors, Manhattan federal court officials will take extraordinary security precautions next week when juries are picked for two major organized crime trials."

The article went on to state that:

> "In Court affidavits submitted by Guiliani's staff, the federal prosecutors maintained they had 'substantial evidence' that efforts might be made to intimidate jurors in the cases."

Next, on September 30th, the New York Post ran a front page headline which read, "NO-NAME JURIES AS MOB BIGS GO ON TRIAL TODAY", with an article explaining that anonymity had been ordered in a related trial because of an informant's "prediction that the defendants will try to 'reach' the jurors" and that the Judge had indicated that bribe attempts and threats against the jury are normal in a case like this. Likewise, on September 30th, WINS radio reported in its newscasts that anonymity was being used to protect the jurors

from bribery and other interference.

On October 1st, the New York Times reported that government attorneys had made clear that anonymity was necessary to protect jurors from jury tampering by the defendants. That same day, the New York Daily News headlined an article with the caption,"MOB TRIALS TRIGGER FEARS OF JURY DUTY." The following day, the New York Post ran a cartoon satirizing the fact that trial judges who order anonymity attempt unsuccessfully to mislead the jurors into believing that it is being done only to protect them from reporters.**

It is therefore clear that the actions taken by the District Court with regard to the jury in this case did substantially interfere with Petitioner's due process right to the protection of the presumption of innocence. Moreover, by refusing to allow

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**The news articles referred to above are set forth in Item 72 of the record on appeal.

the jurors to disclose their names and addresses, the Court prevented the Petitioner from making an intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges. Particularly in light of the recent decisions of this Court emphasizing the importance of an adequate voir dire and the absence of any adequate justification for the restrictions imposed in this case, those restrictions were unconstitutional and require that Petitioner's convictions be set aside.

POINT III

PETITIONER, GENNARO LANGELLA, JOINS IN AND ADOPTS THE POINTS SET FORTH IN THE PETITIONS OF CARMINE PERSICO, ALPHONSE PERSICO AND OTHER PETITIONERS.

Petitioner points out that certain arguments have been made in the petitions of co-petitioners, especially with relation to the propriety of the Trial Court receiving testimony on behalf of one, Frederick DeChristopher. Because Petitioner does not want to impose additional burdens upon this Court, Petitioner does not set forth at length all of the arguments contained in those petitions, but has intended to focus on those issues arising to a great degree in this petition rather than that of the other Petitioners. Petitioner wishes this Court to recognize the fact that he does not minimize the importance of those other issues. For example, DeChristopher's testimony that while Carmine Persico was hiding out at the DeChristopher house, Persico

told DeChristopher that Petitioner Langella was in essence running the Family for him, and the Trial Court received testimony in such hearsay fashion which clearly implicated Langella which came out of the mouth of DeChristopher testifying to things he supposedly heard from Persico. Thus, the constitutional basis and propriety of receiving that type of evidence is as important for Langella as it is for the other Petitioners. The other issues raised, such as the undue publicity, sequestration of the jury and other matters are equally applicable to Petitioner Langella.

CONCLUSION

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted,

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88-788

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 6 1988
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No.: _____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

GENNARO LANGELLA,

Petitioner,

-against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 1036,1037,1038,1039,1050,1051,1052,1056

August Term, 1986

(Argued July 13,1987,Decided October 27,1987)

Docket Nos. 86-1468,-1479,-1480,-1481,
-1482,-1483,-1484,-1494

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee,

-against-

CARMINE PERSICO, a/k/a "Snake," a/k/a "Junior," HUGH McINTOSH, a/k/a "Apples", GENNARO LANGELLA, a/k/a "Jerry Lang," JOHN DeROSS, a/k/a "Jackie," ANTHONY SCARPATI, a/k/a "Scappy," ALPHONSE PERSICO, a/k/a "Little Allie Boy," ANDREW RUSSO, a/k/a "Andy Mush," and DOMINIC CATALDO, a/k/a "Little Dom,"

Defendants-Appellants.

B e f o r e:

NEWMAN, MINER and ALTIMARI,

Circuit Judges.

Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Keenan,J.) convicting appellants of various offenses arising from their participation in the affairs of the Colombo Family racketeering enterprise.

Affirmed as to all appellants except that the substantive RICO convictions of appellants McIntosh and Russo are reversed.

Judge Newman concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.

STANLEY M. MEYER, New York, NY (**DePetris & Meyer, Esqs.**, New York, NY, of counsel; Martin G. Weinberg, Boston, MA, of counsel for defendant-appellant Carmine Persico)for Defendants-Appellants Carmine Persico, John DeRoss, Anthony Scarpati and Alphonse Persico.

SALVATORE J. MARINELLO, Mineola,NY (Elaine Jackson Stack, Marinello & Rosenstock, Mineola, NY, of counsel) for Defendant-Appellant Andrew Russo.

SUSAN G. KELLMAN, New York, NY for Defendant-Appellant Hugh McIntosh

MICHAEL YOUNG, New York, NY (David Breitbart,New York,NY,of counsel) for Defendant-Appellant Gennaro Langella.

JOHN L. POLLOK, New York,NY (Mark A. Summers, Susan C. Wolfe, Todtman, Hoffman, Epstein,Young, Goldstein, Tunick & Pollok,P.C., New York, NY, of counsel) for Defendant-Appellant Dominic Cataldo

AARON R. MARCU, Assistant United States Attorney, New York, NY (Rudolph W. Giuliani, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Bruce A. Baird, Frank H. Sherman, Stuart E. Abrams, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York, NY, of counsel) for Appellee United States of America.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-appellants Carmine Persico, Hugh McIntosh, Gennaro Langella, John DeRoss, Anthony Scarpati, Alphonse Persico, Andrew Russo and Dominic Cataldo appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Keenan, J.), convicting them of various

offenses arising from their participation in the affairs of the Colombo Family racketeering enterprise. All eight appellants were convicted of conspiracy to violate provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d) (1982), and seven of the appellants were convicted of substantive RICO violations, id. § 1962 (c). In addition, the majority of various substantive offenses that also were charged as predicate racketeering acts.

On appeal, appellants raise a plethora of claims, only a few of which require discussion. Russo and McIntosh contend that their convictions for substantive RICO violations and RICO conspiracy must be overturned on statute of limitations and double jeopardy grounds. Langella challenges the district court's decision to empanel an anonymous jury. Carmine Persico claims that the district court's sequestration decisions were

improper and he raises a due process challenge to the government's compensation arrangement with a key witness. Various appellants join in these claims, and all appellants challenge the admission of a co-conspirator's statements against them. Of these claims, the only ones that have merit are the statute of limitations claims advanced by Russo and McIntosh regarding their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c). As a result, we affirm the judgments convicting all appellants, except that we reverse as to the section 1962(c) convictions of Russo and McIntosh.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual predicate for the convictions giving rise to this appeal has been recounted in numerous recent opinions, see United States v. Langella, 804 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Persico,

774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Persico, 646 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y., aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Persico, 520 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), familiarity with which is assumed. A general outline of the schemes alleged is presented below; to the degree necessary, specific factual recitations relating to the claims meriting review on this appeal are included as part of the discussion of those specific claims.

Appellants and six co-defendants were charged, in a 51-count superseding indictment filed on April 4, 1985, with leading, managing and participating in the Colombo Family racketeering enterprise, a professional criminal organization that is one of the New York City constituent units of the American Mafia, by committing or agreeing to

commit numerous crimes. Of the six co-defendants not represented in this appeal, five had their cases severed prior to or during trial, and one, Frank Falanga, who was found guilty by the jury, died prior to sentencing.

The government delineated the organizational structure of the Colombo Family as follows: Carmine Persico, the Boss of the Colombo Family, assisted by Gennaro Langella, the Underboss, and a Consiglieri, or adviser, led the Family, Alphonse Persico, Carmine's eldest son, also was a trusted adviser and an initiate member of the Family. Anthony Scarpati, John DeRoss and Andrew Russo were Capos, or captains, in the organization. Each Capo is a trusted officer of the Family who leads a crew of "soldiers", consisting of initiated members of the Family. The "soldiers", in turn, command crews of "associates." An "associate" is a criminal colleague who either is ineligible for,uninterested

in, or awaiting formal induction into the Mafia. Dominic Cataldo was a soldier in the Family, and Hugh McIntosh and deceased co-defendant Frank Falanga were associates.

All eight appellants were charged with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of the Colombo Family enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)**. The enumerated predicate acts of racketeering included: extortion and labor bribery in the construction and restaurant industries; repeated bribes to an undercover Internal Revenue Service agent; bribery of federal prison officials; loansharking; and distributing large amounts of narcotics. Langella, DeRoss and Scarpati also were charged with conspiracy to participate in the Colombo Family's affairs through the collection of unlawful debts. **18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)**; see **id. § 1962(c)**. In addition, all eight appellants

were charged with the substantive crime of conducting and participating in the affairs of the Colombo Family enterprise through essentially the same pattern of racketeering activity described above, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Various appellants were charged with substantive crimes that formed the basis for the patterns of racketeering activity alleged in the RICO counts. Many other charges were dismissed prior to or during trial and are not recounted here. Carmine Persico and Langella were charged with conspiracy to extort money from concrete construction firms in the New York City area, in violation of the Hobbs Acts, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), and Langella was charged with participating in the commission of ten substantive extortionate acts involving various concrete construction companies. See id.; id. § (b)2.

The government accused Langella and Carmine Persico of directing severed co-defendant Ralph Scopo, the president of the District Council of Cement and Concrete Workers Unions, to extort cash payments from at least ten different concrete contractors. These extortions were part of a two-tier scheme formulated by four of the La Cosa Nostra crime families in the New York City area. Pursuant to this scheme, construction projects worth $2 million dollars or less fell within the jurisdiction of the Colombo Family; contractors doing such jobs paid the Colombo Family one percent of the gross contract price of every job in order to prevent labor strife or supply problems. Jobs worth more than $2 million dollars were controlled by a consortium comprised of the Colombo Family and three other New York City area crime families. See generally **Langella, 804 F.2d at 187-88.**

John DeRoss, a vice president of Local 100 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, was charged with soliciting and receiving unlawful payments from, or in connection with, five Manhattan restaurants, in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The government alleged that DeRoss participated in a scheme in which bribes were solicited and received from restaurant owners so that the owners would be able to violate the terms of their agreements with Local 100 without interference from the union. The government contended that in one instance a bribe was solicited and received as compensation for allowing a restaurant owner to retain the lease for his restaurant.

Carmine Persico and Alphonse Persico were charged with paying bribes and gratuities to a federal prison official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1),201(b)(3)

& 201(f)(1982). In this count, the government contended that the Persicos paid the bribes and gratuities to a prison official at the Federal Correctional Institution in Ashland, Kentucky, in order to obtain, or on account of, various unwarranted privileges the official sought or obtained for Carmine Persico, who then was an inmate at that correctional facility. The Persicos and Langella also were accused of offering and paying a $20,000.00 bribe to a federal official in exchange for Carmine Persico's transfer from one federal prison to another, in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3).**

Langella, Scarpati and Russo were charged with conspiracy to make extortionate extensions of credit, **see 18 U.S.C. §§ 891, 892** and conspiracy to collect extensions of credit using extortionate means, **see id. §§ 891, 894.** The government's theory was that these appellants and others employed the

Colombo Family as a vehicle for lending money at exorbitant rates of interest, and collecting loansharking debts, through the threatened use of force and violence if the loans were not repaid. Langella and Scarpati also were accused of specific collections of credit using extortionate means, in violation of **18 U.S.C. § 894**.

Numerous other acts of racketeering included as predicate acts in the **RICO** counts were not charged as substantive offenses. Four appellants, including McIntosh and Russo made pretrial motions to dismiss from the **RICO** counts, on double jeopardy grounds, the predicate acts involving the repeated bribery of an undercover IRS agent. These acts, which were not charged as substantive offenses, had been the subject of an investigation and prosecution in the Eastern District of New York, which resulted in guilty pleas by the four appellants to a few of the charges against them. The district court denied the motion,

United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), and, on an interlocutory appeal, we affirmed, United States v. Persico 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985).

Trial commenced on October 15, 1985, and, after an eight-month trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all eight appellants on the RICO conspiracy count. All appellants, save DeRoss also were convicted on the substantive RICO count,Carmine Persico and Langella were convicted of extortionate conspiracy in the concrete construction industry, and Langella was convicted of participation in the extortion of money from specific construction firms. DeRoss was acquitted of the substantive Hobbs Act counts concerning the restaurant industry. Carmine and Alphonse Persico were convicted of paying an illegal gratuity to a federal prison official, and the Persicos and Langella also were convicted of offering to pay a bribe to

a federal official. Guilty verdicts were returned against Langella and Scarpati both for conspiracy to make extortionate extensions of credit and for conspiracy to collect extensions of credit using extortionate means; Russo was acquitted of those conspiracy counts. Langella and Scarpati also were convicted of making and collecting various specific extortionate extensions of credit.

The appeal followed the imposition of sentences in the district court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Double Jeopardy

The predicate acts that underlie McIntosh's and Russo's **RICO** convictions also were the subject of a prior investigation and prosecution in the Eastern District investigation revealed that Russo, McIntosh and others had offered and paid numerous bribes to IRS Agent Annicharico, who was posing as a corrupt law enforcement official, in what has

come to be known as the Annicharico bribe scheme. Pursuant to that scheme, Russo, McIntosh and Carmine Persico bribed Annicharico to prevent the commencement of federal criminal prosecutions of Charles Panarella and Russo, and to influence the disposition of Carmine Persico's application to vacate his sentence. McIntosh and Carmine Persico bribed Anninicharico to prevent Persico's transfer from a federal prison in Manhattan. Russo and Cataldo bribed the agent to prevent the commencement of a federal criminal prosecution against Cataldo. Russo also bribed Annicharico to prevent the commencement of a state perjury prosecution and to eliminate back tax liability for an associate and a corporate entity.

McIntosh and Russo were indicted in the Eastern District of New York for their roles in the Annicharico bribe scheme. On April 26, 1982, Russo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to bribe a public official, see 18 U.S.C. § 371

(1982), and obstruction of justice, id. § 1505. On November 1, 1982, after four days of trial, McIntosh pleaded guilty to bribery of a public official. Id § 201(b). Subsequent to the guilty pleas, several other charges against McIntosh and Russo were dismissed on the government's motion.

After the filing of the superseding indictment in the instant case, Russo and McIntosh moved pre-trial to have the charges against them dismissed, claiming that the RICO charges predicated on acts relating to the Annicharico bribe scheme were barred by their guilty pleas in the Eastern District prosecution. [1] The district court rejected

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1 We note that all of the racketeering acts charged against McIntosh were committed as part of the Annicharico bribe scheme, whereas the RICO charges against Russo included racketering acts unrelated to that scheme. However, the jury indicated that its verdict against Russo was based solely on the Annicharico bribe scheme predicate acts. Because of the manner in which we dispose of Russo's and McIntosh's double jeopardy challenges infra, the differences between their claims are irrelevant for purposes of our decision, and we will discuss their claims together.

their pre-trial double jeopardy claims, and we affirmed the district court's judgment on interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985). McIntosh's and Russo's attempts to raise a double jeopardy challege to their convictions after trial also were rejected by the district court. See United States v. Persico, 646 F. Supp. 752, 759-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Subsequent motions to vacate their Eastern District criminal convictions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), were rejected in the district court and on appeal. See United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986). On this appeal, Russo and McIntosh again contend that the double jeopardy clause bars their RICO convictions. We disagree.

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment declares: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put

in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause protects against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The contentions raised by Russo and McIntosh implicate primarily the second aspect of double jeopardy protection.

In part employing the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), Judge Keenan rejected the double jeopardy claims of McIntosh and Russo. In Garrett, the Supreme Court "upheld the validity of using a prior criminal conviction to support a continuing criminal enterprise conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, at least where the 'enterprise' activity continues four months past the date

of the conduct underlying the prior conviction." **Persico, 774 F.2d at 32.** Under the two-step analysis employed by the Supreme Court in reaching that conclusion, the trial court initially must determine whether the legislature intended that each violation be a separate offense. **Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778.** If such intent is evident, the court must then determine whether prosecution for the later offense after an earlier prosecution for a predicate offense violates the double jeopardy clause, under the particular circumstances of the case. **Id. at 786.**

In affirming Judge Keenan's judgment denying Russo's and McIntosh's pre-trial motions, we endorsed Judge Keenan's determination that "Congress intended to permit conduct resulting in prior convictions to be used as predicate acts of racketeering activity to establish subsequent **RICO** convictions," **Persico, 774 F.2d at 32** (citations

omitted), as well as his conclusion that a trial on the then-pending **RICO** charges was not barred by the double jeopardy clause, **id.** We note that the indictment alleged that the substantive conduct and conspiracy continued, with the participation of all appellants, well beyond the date of the indictments in the Annicharico bribe scheme case. However, we specifically declined to decide whether evidence of post-plea unlawful conduct, or evidence accumulated after the plea demonstrating participation in the criminal enterprise, was required in order to defeat a double jeopardy challenge to a subsequent indictment. **Id.** After trial, Judge Keenan determined that the government sufficiently had demonstrated that Russo and McIntosh continued as members of the criminal enterprise charged well after pleading guilty in the Eastern District. **Persico, 646 F. Supp. at 760.** That judgment is the focus of their current appeal.

As an initial matter, we entertain serious doubt as to whether evidence of post-plea involvement is necessary to defeat double jeopardy challenge to **RICO** convictions based on predicate acts that were the subject of prior guilty pleas. The Supreme Court in **Garrett** assumed, for purposes of decision, that the predicate act resulting in conviction was a lesser included offense within the continuing criminal enterprise charge. As the Court noted, the subsequent prosecution would not have not barred on double jeopardy grounds even assuming that lesser included offense principles applied. **See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 790** (majority opinion); **id. at 797** (O'Connor,J., concurring). In fact, the Court cautioned against "ready transposition" of lesser included offense principles derived from cases such as **Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977)** (misdemeanor of joyriding lesser included offense within felony of auto

theft), to complex, "multilayered conduct" cases. **Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789.** Moreover, several circuits have held that, in similar contexts, the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to **RICO** prosecutions predicated on racketeering acts that were the subject of prior prosecutions and convictions. **See, e.g.,** United States v. Grayson, **795 F.2d 278, 282-83 (3rd Cir. 1986)** (admission of two prior drug conspiracy convictions as predicate acts for **RICO** substantive charge not violative of double jeopardy clause), **cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 927 (1987);** United States v. Boldin, **772 F.2d 719, 728-30 (11th Cir.1985)** (prior convictions for drug offenses may be used as predicate acts in subsequent **RICO** prosecutions); United States v. Licavoli, **725 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (6th Cir.)** (prior bribery conviction properly employed as a predicate act in subsequent **RICO** conviction), **cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984);** United States

v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ("a defendant may be convicted for the predicate acts which form the basis of a RICO charge and subsequently charged under RICO"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1980) (extortionate act properly employed as a predicate racketeering act despite prior RICO conviction involving conspiracy to commit that extortion as well as others), cert. denied, 450 U.S.980 (1981).

We need not reach this thorny issue, however, because as Judge Keenan found, the government supplied ample evidence of Russo's and McIntosh's continued participation in the affairs of the Colombo Family enterprise after their guilty pleas in the Eastern District. The government demonstrated at trial that Russo was a leader of and an active participant in, the Colombo Family at least until April 1985, when the superseding

indictment was filed. Not only was there testimony from Fred DeChristopher, Russo's brother-in-law, regarding Russo's continued membership in the Colombo Family, but the government also provided evidence that Russo and his sons skimmed money in 1983 and 1984 from the gambling proceeds of a cruise ship casino. Further, the government demonstrated that McIntosh continued to participate in the Colombo Family enterprise's affairs after his guilty plea. DeChristopher testified that Carmine Persico told him that McIntosh remained a member of the enterprise and that when McIntosh was in prison as a result of the Eastern District prosecution, Persico had authorized weekly payments to McIntosh's wife. The government also showed that in November and December of 1978, McIntosh accepted 28 collected telephone calls from Carmine Persico. Later testimony revealed that these calls enabled Carmine Persico to

conduct the Colombo Family's affairs while in prison. Among the other evidence was a 1982 telephone conversation between Langella and McIntosh, intercepted by the government, in which they arguably discussed Colombo Family matters. Based on the foregoing and on all of evidence presented, we hold that the government sufficiently established that Russo and McIntosh remained members of the Colombo Family after their guilty pleas in the Eastern District and we affirm Judge Keenan's judgment denying Russo's and McIntosh's motions to set aside the jury verdict on double jeopardy grounds.

We also find no error in Judge Keenan's decision to rule on the merits of McIntosh's and Russo's double jeopardy claims after trial, rather than submitting those claims to the jury in some manner. "[D]ouble jeopardy claims [do] not implicate the issue [a defendant's] guilt or innocence, which a jury must

decide, but rather the right of the government to bring the action itself." United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1986); see United States v. H.E. Koontz Creamery, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (D. Md. 1964); see also 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 194, at 715 & n.17 (1982 & Supp. 1987). For that reason, district courts routinely respond to pre-trial motions to dismiss indictments on double jeopardy grounds, and, if appropriate, conduct evidentiary hearings to determine whether a defendant has a valid double jeopardy claim. See, e.g., United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.) (describing procedure for district court to follow in determining pre-trial double jeopardy claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). We perceive no reason why a double jeopardy claim should not be decided by the trial judge throughout all stages of the

trial, even when, as in the instant case, the claim requires factual determinations. The assertion of a valid double jeopardy claim at any stage in the trial "precludes trial and thus removes from the jury the issue of guilt or innocence." **MacDougall, 790 F.2d at 1142; cf. United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980)** (defense of outrageous government conduct properly decided by judge, rather than jury, because it bars government from invoking judicial processes to obtain conviction). Moreover, unlike statute of limitations or venue claims, which merely require a defendant to refute the evidence presented by the government on a particular charge, the type of double jeopardy challenge presented by Russo and McIntosh requires a defendant to show that the acts alleged as part of the current prosecution already have been the subject of successful prior prosecutions. When double

jeopardy claims are determined by a trial judge as opposed to a jury,

> [t]he likelihood of compelling the defendant to make possible incriminating statements to the jury about the earlier offense in his defense to the subsequent charge or of prejudicing the jurors against the defendant by virtue of their hearing about the charge and evidence in the previous case is thus eliminated.

Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1119. Rather than requiring the district court to charge the jury so as to encompass this type of double jeopardy claim, we think it appropriate for the district court to rule on the claim before, during or after trial.

B. Statute of Limitations

Russo and McIntosh both contend that their **RICO** convictions are barred by the five year statute of limitations applicable to **RICO** prosecutions, **18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982)**; **see** United States v. Walsh, **700 F.2d 846, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983),**

because the last predicate acts ascribable to them occurred more than five years prior to the date of the indictment in the instant case. Judge Keenan denied McIntosh's pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds, **Persico, 621 F. Supp. at 872-73**, and denied McIntosh's and Russo's post-trial statute of limitations motions. **Persico, 646 F. Supp. at 760.**

1. RICO Conspiracy

The government argues, and Judge Keenan determined, that the statute of limitations for **RICO** conspiracy should not begin to run until the accomplishment or abandonment of the objectives of the conspiracy. We agree. In order to convict a defendant of **RICO** conspiracy, only an agreement to commit two or more predicate acts, rather than the acts themselves, need be proven. **United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921**

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). By his agreement, a RICO defendant signals his membership in a conspiracy to conduct the affairs of the charged enterprise. Thus, the RICO conspiracy statute is most closely analogous to other conspiracy statutes pursuant to which overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy need not be placed or proven. See, e.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1023 (2d Cir. 1980) (narcotics distribution and importation conspiracies); United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 1129, 1134 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy to make extortionate extensions of credit), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); United States v. Tolub, 187 F. Supp. 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)(Kaufman,J.) (Hobbs Act conspiracy). Under such statutes, "[f]or limitations purposes, the conspiracy may be deemed terminated when, in a broad

sense, its objectives have either been accomplished or abandoned, not when its last overt act was committed." **Grammatikos, 633 F.2d at 1023.**

The statute of limitations applicable to **RICO** conspiracy provides that "no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found. . . within five years after such offense shall have been committed." **18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).** The limitations period is measured from the point at which the crime is complete. **See** Toussie v. United States, **397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).** Because the **RICO** conspiracy statute does not require proof of an overt act, we believe that the crime of **RICO** conspiracy is not complete until the purposes of the conspiracy either have been accomplished or abandoned. **See** United States v. Coia, **719 F.2d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984);**

United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); but see United States v. Torres-Lopez, 656 F. Supp. 257, 262 (D.P.R.1987) (government must show one overt act by any conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy within limitations period). Although proof of a RICO conspiracy requires a demonstration that a defendant agreed to commit two or more predicate acts, rather than a simple showing that the defendant agreed to join the conspiracy, the agreement proscribed by section 1962(d) is conspiracy to participate in a charged enterprise's affairs, not conspiracy to commit predicate acts. We perceive no valid reason why the RICO conspiracy statute should be analyzed in a manner inconsistent with other conspiracy statutes not requiring proof of overt acts.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the statute of limitations for the RICO conspiracy charges at issue here did not

begin to run at least until the filing of the indictment. As Judge Keenan noted,the government amply demonstrated that the conspiracy to conduct the affairs of the Colombo Family continued until, and well after, April 4, 1985, the date the superseding indictment was filed. Therefore, Russo's and McIntosh's convictions for **RICO** conspiracy were not barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations.

2. Substantive RICO Counts

The district court determined that the statute of limitation for **18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)** should begin to run from the last overt act committed by any member of the group charged. We reach a different conclusion based on prior circuit precedent.

In **United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983),** we held that in order to establish a defendant's violation of section **1962(c)**, the

government must prove that the defendant committed two or more predicate offenses, at least one of which occurred within the federal five-year statute of limitations for non-capital offenses. **Id. at 851.** In rejecting Walsh's claim that the evidence indicated only that a co-defendant had committed a timely predicate act, we emphasized that there was sufficient evidence that Walsh also had committed the act. Central to our analysis was the fact that Walsh himself had participated in a timely predicate act. Similarly, in **United States v. Srulowitz, 785 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1986)**, we analyzed Srulowitz's statute of limitations claim solely with regard to predicate acts alleged against him, despite the apparent commission of timely predicate acts by other members of the charged enterprise. **Id. at 390. See also United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir.1983)** (government must prove defendant committed at least one timely predicate

act), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Castallano, 610 F. Supp. at 1383 ("Section 3282 does not require that each defendant be named in at least one act of racketeering which is alleged to have occurred in the last five years."); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (statute runs from date of last act of racketeering), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.),cert. dismissed 439 U.S. 801 (1978); but see United States v. Torres Lopez, 656 F. Supp. at 261 (act by any member of enterprise satisfies statute of limitations).

We find the government's attempt to distinguish Srulowitz and Walsh as "single defendant cases" unpersuasive. Both Walsh and Srulowitz had co-defendants,as the respective opinions bearing their names make clear. See Walsh, 700 F.2d at 851; Srulowitz, 785 F.2d at 383. Even if we were to assume that Walsh and Srulowitz involved single defendants,

under the government's statute of limitations analysis it would have been sufficient for us to determine whether any unindicted member of the enterprise had committed timely predicate acts, a search that we did not undertake. Instead, we focused solely on the defendant who raised the limitations defense and determined that he had committed one predicate act within the limitations period.

Based on the reasoning of our prior decisions, we conclude that in order to satisfy the statute of limitations for section **1962(c)**, the government must demonstrate that a defendant committed at least one predicate racketeering act within the limitations period. Such a conclusion comports with the structure of section **1962**, which treats conspiracies to violate **RICO** and substantive **RICO** offenses separately. The focus of section **1962(c)** is on the individual patterns of racketeering engaged in by a defendant, rather than the collective activities of the

members of the enterprise, which are proscribed by section **1962(d)**. We reject the government's attempt to analyze section **1962(c)** as if it were a second **RICO** conspiracy statute. Therefore, because the government failed to demonstrate that either Russo or McIntosh committed a predicate act within the five-year statute of limitations, we reverse their convictions under section **1962(c)**. [2]

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2 On appeal, the government contends that reversal of Russo's conviction is not warranted because he was a fugitive for nearly two years and therefore that the statute of limitations was tolled during that time. **See 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1982)** ("No statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice."). However, the government did not present this argument to the district court, nor was Russo allowed the opportunity to defend against it. Instead,the government requests that we determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled as to Russo based on random references culled from the record.

As the Supreme Court noted in a similar context, the government "may lose its right to raise factual issues of this sort before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions of in a timely fashion during the litigation."

C. Admissibility of Co-conspirator's Statements

Carmine Persico, Alphonse Persico, DeRoss, Scarpati and Russo, joined by the

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Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (emphasis added)(factual question whether defendant was"resident" of house for purposes of determining if he had reasonable expectation of privacy in that dwelling waived by, inter alia, government's failure to raise issue in lower courts). See United States v. Kimmel,741 F.2d 1123,1125 (9th Cir.1984) (review of issues in dismissal of indictment on due process and double jeopardy grounds limited to those actually raised by government at hearing on motion to dismiss); United States v. Thompson, 710 F. 2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1983) (alternate justifications for search waived by government's failure to raise them at suppression hearing), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984); United States v.Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508, 509 n.1 (5th Cir.1982)(government waived issue of defendant's standing to complain of stop and search by failing to raise it below); United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050 n.9 (9th Cir.) (government waived right to raise issue whether jury, rather than judge, should determine if defendant was fleeing from justice under 18 U.S.C. §3290 by failing to raise it in timely fashion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 837 (1982). Here, the government apparently concedes that it did not raise this issue in the district court, and has offered no justification for its failure to do so. Therefore, we deem the issue to be waived.

three remaining appellants to the extent relevant to them, all claim that the district court committed reversible error by admitting Fred DeChristopher's testimony about conversations he had with Carmine Persico when Persico was "in hiding" at DeChristopher's house. We disagree.

Statements offered against a party and made by a co-conspirator of that party in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible against that party. **Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see, e.g., United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 269 & 107 S.Ct. 326 (1986).** The district court found that the elements of **Rule 801(d)(2)(E)** were satisfied here and held that DeChristopher's testimony regarding Carmine Persico's statements to him was admissible. Appellants argue principally that the statements made

were not in furtherance of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy had ended by the time the statements were made. Absent an abuse of discretion, the district court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal. **See Rahme, 813 F.2d at 36; United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985); see also United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1232 (2d Cir.1983),cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).** We perceive no abuse of discretion by Judge Keenan.

The evidence provided by the government undermines completely appellants' contention that the conspiracy ended when the original indictment was unsealed in October 1984, prior to the time when Carmine Persico's damaging statements were made. Rather, the government amply demonstrated that the conspiracy was ongoing at least until the time of trial. In fact, the reason for Carmine

Persico's presence in the DeChristopher household, as the government's proof convincingly demonstrated, was to avoid prosecution under the indictment in this case. That some of the conspirators had been indicted and were under arrest is unimportant; as some of the charges in this case indicate,the Colombo Family was quite capable of continuing operations despite the fact that some of its members were incarcerated. Moreover, some members of the conspiracy found prison no obstacle to continuing their association with the enterprise. The very purpose of one of the bribe schemes charged was to ensure that Carmine Persico would have ready access to a telephone while in prison, so that he could continue to conduct the Colombo Family's affairs while incarcerated. In this type of enterprise, the mere imprisonment of some of its members does not precipitate the demise of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v

Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 839 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963); United States v. Guerro, 693 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1982).Therefore, we agree with Judge Keenan's determination that the conspiracy continued beyond the period during which Carmine Persico made his damaging admissions to DeChristopher.

We also find no error in Judge Keenan's determination that Carmine Persico's statements to DeChristopher were in furtherance of the conspiracy. DeChristopher already was a member of the conspiracy at the time Carmine Persico came to stay at his house, having been involved in the Colombo Family's efforts to skim the gambling profits of a cruise ship. Persico's statements to DeChristopher regarding the activities of the enterprise and the various roles of appellants in it clearly were in furtherance of the enterprise. Among other purpose, the

statements "prompt[ed DeChristopher] to respond in a way that facilitate[d] the carrying out of criminal activity," **Rahme, 813 F.2d at 35 (citing** United States v. Katsougrakis**, 715 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)**, informed DeChristopher of the "current status of the conspiracy," **id. at 35-36** (quoting **United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238,252 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983)**), apprised him of the progress of the conspiracy and solicited his assistance, **id. at 36** (citing **Paone, 782 F.2d at 391**), and informed DeChristopher of the identity and activities of his co-conspirators, **id.** (citing **inter alia,** United States v. Perez**, 702 F.2d 33,37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983)**).

Because neither factual determination challenged by appellants was clearly erroneous, we will not disturb Judge Keenan's decision to admit DeChristopher's damaging testimony into evidence.

D. Compensation Arrangement

Carmine Persico contends that the government's cooperation arrangement with Joseph Iannuzzi amounted to a contingency fee that was so likely to induce him to implicate appellants falsely as to deny them due process. After carefully considering the briefs and record in this case, we conclude that appellants' due process right were not violated by the admission of Iannuzzi's testimony.

Iannuzzi, a long-time associate of the Gambino Family, entered into an agreement with the FBI to provide information regarding La Cosa Nostra and to testify at trials resulting from the information he supplied. In exchange for his cooperation, Iannuzzi was promised a monthly salary, as well as a lump sum payment after all trials were completed, the amount of which would be

based on the FBI's evaluation of the "overall quality" of any cases that had been developed. A later rendition of this agreement described the lump sum payment as covering reasonable travel and relocation expenses to a new, and presumable safe, location in the United States. The written agreement also specified that the FBI would determine the amount of payment. As the government conceded at oral argument, however, the written agreement did not supersede the prior "understanding." During trial, the entire scope of the relationship between Iannuzzi and the FBI was revealed to the jury, and defense counsel were permitted to cross-examine Iannuzzi thoroughly regarding the compensation arrangement.

Carmine Persico contends that the agreement between Iannuzzi and the FBI constitutes an impermissible contingent fee

arrangement. Such arrangements, however, are not per se impermissible. Rather, whether a particular arrangement violates a defendant's due process rights must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. See United States v. Cresta, slip op. 1, 15 (1st Cir.July 23, 1987). The overwhelming majority of courts, in assessing contingent fee arrangements with informants, have permitted the informant's testimony to be introduced at trial and have deemed the method of payment "a matter for the jury to consider in weighing the credibility of the informant." United States v. Hodge, 594 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.1979) (citation omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545, 546-47 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam); United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 394-96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971).

In urging us to exclude Iannuzzi's "purchased" testimony, Carmine Persico relies primarily on a recent Fifth Circuit opinion in which a panel majority, in interpreting **Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1962)**, held impermissible a contingent fee arrangement because the informant was promised compensation if he could implicate a preselected individual and because the payment decisions were based on the quality of the informant's work in obtaining a conviction. **See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 800 F.2d 452, 457-60 (5th Cir.1986).**

Were we to adopt that rationale, the government's arrangement with Iannuzzi conceivably could fall within the **Cervantes-Pacheco** proscription against compensation based on the quality of the informant's work. But see **United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir.)** (statement that

reward depended on "final results" not sufficient to mandate exclusion of testimony), **cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828 (1977)**. However, Persico's reliance on **Cervantes-Pacheco** has proven to be ill-advised: The Fifth Circuit, sitting **en banc**, recently reversed the panel majority in **Cervantes-Pacheco** and overruled **Williamson**. **See** United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, **slip op. 6274 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 1987) (en banc)**.

The Fifth Circuit's **en banc** opinion makes clear that "the credibility of the compensated witness, like that of the witness, promised a reduced sentence, is [for a] properly instructed jury to determine." **Id. at 6280**. Like the Fifth Circuit, we have confidence in the jury's ability to assess counsels' argument about the inherent unreliability of "purchased" testimony, and to evaluate the witness' credibility accordingly.

Here, the jury was instructed fully by the district court regarding Iannuzzi's credibility. Moreover, the jury was provided with a complete explication of the circumstances surrounding Iannuzzi's cooperation arrangement with the government, and defense counsel as afforded ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness and present evidence regarding the arrangement. Under the circumstance, the informant's testimony properly was before the jury and the informant's compensation arrangement with the government properly was considered by the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness. We hold, therefore that the admission of Iannuzzi's testimony did not violate appellant's due process rights. Furthermore, the promise of compensation related to the "overall quality" of cases that were developed and did not depend on the outcome of any prosecution or the inclusion of any preselected person in the accusation.

E. Procedures Relating to the Jury

Langella's challenge to the district court's decision to empanel an anonymous jury is without merit. Judge Keenan based his decision on "the violent acts alleged to have been committed in the normal course of Colombo Family business, the Family's willingness to corrupt and obstruct the criminal justice system, and the extensive publicity this case is expected to continue to attract." **Persico, 621 F. Supp. at 879.** We find no fault with the district court's conclusion that an anonymous jury was necessary. **See** United States v. Barnes, **604 F.2d 121, 134-35,137 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).** In addition, Judge Keenan properly conducted a searching voir dire, which alleviated the risk that providing jurors with anonymity would cast unfair aspersions on appellants. **See** United States v. Thomas, **757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir.),**

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985). The various other security precautions taken by Judge Keenan, including segregating jurors during lunch time and recesses and having marshals transport the jurors to a central location from which they were discharged each day, were fully warranted by the circumstances of this case.

Carmine Persico's claim of error predicated on Judge Keenan's decision not to sequester the jury during the eight-month trial followed by his decision to sequester the jury during deliberations fares no better. Sequestration is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not constitute reversible error absent a showing of actual prejudice arising therefrom. **See, e.g.,** United v. Phillips, **664 F.2d 971, 998 n.24 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982);** United States v. Johnson,

584 F.2d 148, 154-55 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979); United States v. Breland, 376 F.2d 721, 723-24 (2d. Cir. 1967). Rather than finding prejudice arising from Judge Keenan's sequestration decisions, we believe that his decision helped protect appellants' rights to a fair trial and were a sensible response to the circumstances presented by this trial.

F. Other Claims

We have examined carefully appellants' remaining claims and find them to be without merit.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of conviction as to appellants Carmine Persico, Langella, DeRoss, Scarpati, Alphonse Persico and Cataldo. We affirm as to appellants McIntosh's and Russo's RICO conspiracy convictions; we reserve as to their convictions for violations of section

1962(c). We commend the district court for its perserverance through the course of these difficult proceedings.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in all aspects of Judge Miner's comprehensive opinion except those portions that reject the double jeopardy defense of defendants McIntosh and Russo with respect to their convictions on the **RICO** substantive and conspiracy counts, **18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) (1982)**; and their statute of limitations defense with respect to their convictions on the **RICO** conspiracy count. As to the jeopardy defense, I believe these defendants are entitled to a retrial so that the jury, rather than the trial judge, can make the critical factual determination of when their criminal conduct occurred. As to

the limitations defense, I believe these defendants are entitled to a dismissal of the conspiracy charge, in addition to the dismissal of the substantive charge ordered by the majority.

1. Double Jeopardy

Whether the jury should have decided the factual dispute on which the jeopardy defense depends appears to be a novel issue not previously considered by any court. Though many aspects of a jeopardy defense are appropriately determined by the trial judge, the issue presented by this case is whether a defendant is entitled to have a jury decide when his alleged criminal conduct occurred under circumstances where the availability of the jeopardy defense turns on that factual determination. My disagreement with the majority concerning the jury's role in resolving this factual dispute requires some explanation of the issues relevant to the

jeopardy defense; as to the most of these issues I share the majority's views.

Initially, I agree with the majority that Congress intended RICO offenses to be separate from and in addition to offenses based on predicate acts, United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983), and that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not necessarily bar a RICO conviction simply because a prior conviction or the facts underlying a prior conviction are used to establish a predicate act, see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (allowing use of facts underlying prior conviction to establish predicate act for a continuing criminal enterprise violation, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982)). In this case the only predicate acts proven against McIntosh and Russo concerned conduct for which they had previously been convicted. In such circumstances, as the majority appears to accept, the double jeopardy defense may

not be rejected in the absence of evidence of continued participation in the affairs of the **RICO** enterprise after some date relevant to the predicate act offenses. Though questioning Judge Keenan's use of the day of the guilty plea to the prior charges as the significant date, the majority is satisfied that even if that date is used, there was sufficient evidence in this case to support a finding that McIntosh and Russo continued to participate in the affairs of the Colombo Family enterprise after the entry of their guilty pleas to the Annicharico bribery offenses. In view of the concurring opinion in **Garrett** by Justice O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote for affirmance, I agree that participation in the affairs of the **RICO** enterprise must be shown to have continued after some date relevant to the predicate act offenses. Though it does not matter in this case, nor did it in **Garrett**, I should think the pertinent date is the last date of the

predicate offense, rather than the date of the plea to that offense. That will normally be the date of the indictment, since the Government frequently indicts for conduct continuing up to that time. Once an indictment has been returned for a predicate act offense, the Government should not be obliged to reindict for continuing conduct occurring between the date of that indictment and the date of conviction, on pain of being barred on jeopardy grounds from using evidence of conduct during that interval in a subsequent **RICO** prosecution.

I disagree with the majority, however, that it was sufficient for the trial judge to make the factual determination that McIntosh and Russo committed enterprise activity after the predicate offenses for which they had been convicted. That determination should have been made by the jury under a proper instruction, which was requested and denied.

In many situations, I readily acknowledge, the trial judge may properly adjudicate a double jeopardy defense. Where the defense poses the issue of whether the statute defining the prior offense and the statute defining the current offense each require proof of a fact not required by the other statute, see **Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)**, that issue of law is manifestly for the trial judge. And whenever the defendant asserts a jeopardy defense in a pretrial motion to secure insulation from trial, the judge may properly decide the motion and make all factual determinations necessary to its resolution. As the majority points out, trial judges regularly decide jeopardy claims raised in advance of trial and conduct evidentiary hearings where necessary. **See, e.g., United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979)**. But if a trial judge has denied a pretrial jeopardy motion, a jury

must make the factual determination at trial as to when the charged offense occurred where, as here, that factual determination is critical to the jeopardy defense.

Once the defendant has shown that the predicate acts the Government intends to prove in a **RICO** prosecution have resulted in a prior conviction, the Government is obliged, by virtue of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in **Garrett**, to prove that the defendant continued to participate in the enterprise after the prior offenses. The majority here accepts that requirement. No case has ever held that where the prosecution is obliged to prove that criminal conduct occurred at a particular time (in this case, after a particular date), the trial judge may take from the jury the issue of whether that circumstance has been proved. Juries regularly make such findings in determining whether the offense charged was committed within the

applicable period of limitations. It is difficult to understand why the jury that determines the time of an offense for purposes of a statutory requirement does not do so for purposes of a constitutional requirement.

The need to have the jury make the factual determination of when the criminal conduct occurred for purposes of a jeopardy defense is highlighted by the circumstances of this case.The jury was asked to determine, as an element of the **RICO** substantive offense whether McIntosh and Russo participated in the affairs of a criminal enterprise; the jury was instructed that it must find that each defendant committed two predicate acts, one of which occurred in the five years preceding the indictment. The defendants requested an instruction that the jury would also have to find some type of conduct subsequent to their predicate act offenses that

established either a second predicate offense or at least participation in a criminal enterprise [1]. This instruction was refused. Thus, the jury was permitted to convict McIntosh and Russo on the basis of evidence that they participated in the criminal enterprise solely by committing the Annicharico bribery offenses. Though there is evidence that would permit a finding of criminal enterprise activity after these offenses, and

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1 The requested instruction focused on the time period after the plea to the prior offenses, since Judge Keenan had expressed the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause required evidence of enterprise activity after that date, or at least accumulation of evidence of such activity after that date. See **United States v. Persico, 620 F.Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without consideration of this point, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985)**. Though I would permit the Government to defeat the jeopardy defense by showing enterprise activity occurring any time after the last date of the prior offense, see text, supra, the defendants cannot be faulted for requesting a charge that used the time period deemed pertinent by the trial judge.

Judge Keenan made such a finding, a jury asked to consider the matter would have been entirely justified in thinking that the evidence of conduct subsequent to the Annicharico offenses was insufficient to prove continued participation in the criminal enterprise. We are thus left with the possible anomaly of a guilty verdict rendered jointly by a jury and a judge who may have found the facts differently. Under the charges as given, the jury could have convicted solely because of the predicate act offenses and may have believed there was no subsequent enterprise activity by McIntosh and Russo, while the judge has made the contrary finding that such subsequent activity occurred. In my judgment, neither the right to trial by jury nor the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause can be circumvented by permitting a judge to replace the jury as the

fact-finder as to when criminal conduct occurred.

The majority upholds the judge's role in making the key factual determination as to enterprise activity out of expressed solicitude for the defendants. Repeating an argument advanced by the Fifth Circuit in **United States v. Stricklin, supra, 591 F.2d at 1119**, the majority suggests that if the jury does the fact-finding, the defendant will be prejudiced in two ways: The jury will hear evidence of the prior conviction, and the defendant may have to make incriminating statements about the prior offense (if there has been no conviction) in order to establish his jeopardy defense. For three reasons, this argument is unavailing. First, the defendant has a right to jury consideration of the factual issue, and, if he believes that submission of the issue to the jury will be harmful, he can ask that the

matter be decided by the judge.[2] McIntosh and Russo sought to have the matter put to the jury and were denied that right. Second, because only time is at issue, the jury can consider the factual issue without ever hearing anything about a prior offense. A defendant raises the jeopardy defense before trial by showing that he has been convicted of a prior offense and disputing that he committed any enterprise activity after the last date of the prior offense. At that

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2 Even if the Government's opportunity to insist on a jury trial, **see Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); Fed. R. Crim. P.23(a)**, were deemed applicable to the narrow factual dispute on which the jeopardy defense turns in this case, a defendant who preferred not to submit the issue to the jury could avoid doing so. He could make his pretrial motion to the judge for dismissal on jeopardy grounds, and, if that motion was denied, appeal either pretrial or post trial to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of enterprise activity after the relevant date. Nothing would require him to renew the jeopardy defense before the jury.

point the burden is on the Government to prove that such activity occurred after the relevant date. If the jeopardy issue is pursued at trial, the jury need be told that it must find such activity to have occurred after the relevant date. There is no need for the jury ever to know about the prior conviction in trials where the fact of conviction is not otherwise in evidence. And because the burden is on the Government to prove the enterprise activity in the relevant time period, the defendant is not obliged to testify or present any evidence to the jury. Third, in this case evidence of the Annicharico bribery offenses was already before the jury because the Government used the defendants' convictions of these offenses to establish the required predicate offenses. Thus jury fact-finding as to when the offense occurred will not prejudice a defendant in any case and surely not in this case.

For these reasons, I conclude that McIntosh and Russo are entitled at least to a new trial.

2. Statute of Limitations

The majority reverses the convictions of McIntosh and Russo on the **RICO** substantive count for lack of evidence that either of them committed a predicate act within the five-year limitations period. I agree with that holding. I disagree, however, with the rejection of the limitations defense as to the **RICO** conspiracy count.

Conspiracies that may be established without proof of an overt act do not terminate for limitations purposes until the objectives of the conspiracy have either been accomplished or abandoned, **see** United States v. Grammatikos, **633 F.2d 1013, 1023, (2d Cir. 1980). RICO** conspiracies do not require proof of an over act. However, it is

the settled law in this Circuit that each defendant charged with a RICO conspiracy must be shown not only to have joined the overall criminal enterprise conspiracy but also to have joined specific conspiracies to commit at least two predicate acts. United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 726, F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). That requirement raises the issue whether a defendant may be convicted of a RICO conspiracy where the Government fails to prove that a specific conspiracy to commit a predicate act continued into the limitations period. I believe we must reject a conviction in such circumstances if we are fully to respect the Teitler-Ruggiero-Barton requirement.

If a defendant can be convicted of a **RICO** conspiracy whenever the objective of the overall conspiracy continue into the limitations period, there seems little point in requiring proof of his agreement to commit two predicate acts. Indeed, as this case illustrates, it is extremely anomalous to insist that at least one predicate act occur within the limitations period in order to convict on a **RICO** substantive count and not require that at least one conspiracy to commit a predicate act continue into the limitations period in order to convict on a **RICO** conspiracy count. McIntosh and Russo committed the **RICO** substantive offense when they first joined the Colombo Family criminal enterprise and thereafter committed the Annicharico bribery offenses. They committed the **RICO** conspiracy offense when they first agreed to join the Colombo Family

criminal enterprise and thereafter agreed to commit the Annicharico bribery offenses. Their conviction on the substantive offense is now vacated because these bribery offenses were completed before the limitations period and no other predicate act occurred within the limitations period. But they stand convicted of the conspiracy offense even though their agreement to commit the bribery offenses ended before the limitations period (when those offenses were complete) and no agreement to commit any other predicate act continued within the limitations period. Thus, these defendants are exonerated because the predicate acts they committed occurred more than five years prior to indictment, but they remain convicted even though their agreement to commit those same acts also ended more than five